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Abstract  
 
This paper analyses the determinants of the optimal size of protected areas and what 
conducts neighboring effects. We investigate in which measure the infrastructure effect and 
the scarcity effect matter. We obtain several results. The size of protected area mainly 
depends on preferences toward forest, on the firms’ production costs and on the relation 
between municipalities. As far as total deforestation is concerned asymmetric regulation is 
better than no regulation. The infrastructure effect always leads to smaller protected areas 
than the scarcity effect. Under the infrastructure effect, centralized decisions do not always 
work in favor of larger protected areas than decentralized decisions contrary to the scarcity 
effect. We also show that decentralized decisions can reach the first best under the 
infrastructure effect without public intervention. A study of protected areas in the Brazilian 
Legal Amazônia corroborates our theoretical results. 
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1 Introduction
Deforestation is the permanent destruction of forests in order to make the land
available for other uses: farming, cattle ranching, timber or urbanization. Trop-
ical rainforests are particularly targeted. The causes of deforestation are sev-
eral. Synthesizing the results of more than 140 economic models, Angelsen and
Kaimowitz (1999) concludes that lower wages, more roads and higher agricul-
tural prices generally lead to more deforestation.
Rainforests shelter over half of the worlds species of plants and animals.
According to Sandler (1993), tropical forests provide a host of local benets
as watersheds, soil erosion protection, timber or non-timber product and global
benets as, for example, carbon storage. Thus as biodiversity preservation gives
non excludable benets, it can be seen as a pure public good whereas timber
yielding excludable benets is a private goods. But some benets coming from
tropical forest are non excludable and non rival only in a country and so have
the characteristics of local public goods. As tropical deforestation yields several
market failures, there is place to public intervention.
Di¤erent types of policies could be used to ght against deforestation. We
nd policies which the aim is to increase and capture forest rent or, by contrast,
to depress agricultural rent, policies that directly regulate land use and cross-
sector policies that underpin the rst three (Angelsen, 2009). Protected area is
an example of the third type. Forest protected areas in IUCN categories 1 to
6 make up 13.5% of the worlds forests (Schmitt et al. 2009), the share being
signicantly higher (20.8%) in rainforests.
Analysis about protected areas seek to know if protected areas enable e¤ec-
tively to ght against deforestation. Indeed protected areas are often located
in remote areas with less pressure on forest (Bruner et al. 2001; DeFries et al.
2005) and once established, deforestation activities shift from inside to outside
the protected areas. Analyzing these spillover e¤ects or what is called neigh-
boring leakage, Andam et al. (2008) nd 10% of protected forests would have
been deforested if they have not been protected in Costa Rica whereas Gaveau
et al. (2009) nd that protected areas reduced deforestation by 24% from 1990
to 2000 in Sumatra. Without taking into account the non-random location of
protected areas, results would be overestimated. For example, a naïve (i.e. sim-
ple mean di¤erences) comparison of protected areas and adjacent areas would
suggest that protected areas reduced deforestation by 59% in Sumatra. Taking
into account both the location bias and the spatial spillover e¤ects, Amin et
al. (2019) show that integral protected areas and indigenous lands allow for
reducing deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazônia.
Overall studies about protected areas are mainly empirical. Because the
di¢ culty to estimate benets or the lack of established property rights, some
theoretical analysis underlines that it is di¢ cult to do the usual trade o¤ be-
tween benets and costs coming from protected area. In this case, the socially
optimal amount of protected area may not be implemented (Dixon and Sherman
(1991), Turner (2002a) and Fisher et al. (1972)). Knowing whether protected
areas have to be established in a centralized or in a decentralized way is an-
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other important point. According to the Oates decentralizations theorem, we
can infer that a decentralized system will be preferred. But spillover e¤ects can
arise between local public goods - protected areas - and, in this case, all depends
on the assumptions set in the model (Besley and Coate, 2003). Busch (2008)
studies cross border e¤ects for transboundary protected areas. Other papers
focus on the pricing of protected areas (Alpizar, 2006), the management of mul-
tiple activities in national parks (Turner, 2000) or, among others, the optimal
provision of services in the parks (Turner 2002b).
Finally, theoretical studies do not analyze the determinants of the optimal
size of protected areas, the role of interactions between several jurisdictions
and what conducts spillover e¤ects. This is the aim of this paper. Following
Oates (2001), it also investigates and compares di¤erent implementation levels,
i.e. decentralized versus centralized level. As protected areas are established
with two implementation levels in Brazil, we nally take the Brazilian Legal
Amazônia as a study case.
We consider that deforestation occurs in a primary forest, covering several
municipalities. Forest has several uses. First, it generates benets to local
populations. For example, they enjoy environmental amenities. Second, forest
provides inputs to rms in order to produce a private good. This good can be,
for example, timber or agriculture foods. As the production of the nal good
leads to deforestation, a regulator decides to protect forest, providing a local
public good. To do that, he uses a command and control policy, establishing a
protected area.
In order to take into account some causes of deforestation, we retain two
alternative assumptions: the infrastructure e¤ect and the scarcity e¤ect. The
infrastructure e¤ect designs the fact that according to several empirical analysis,
roads or railroad lead to a greater access to forest and accelerates deforestation.1
On the contrary, a little primary forest area will increase the costs as new land is
less easily available, that is the scarcity e¤ect. Whereas the scarcity e¤ect raises
the deforestation cost, the infrastructure e¤ect reduces them. In this article,
we investigate whether both cost e¤ects matter in the design of the size of the
protected area.2
Our way to consider the infrastructure and the scarcity e¤ects di¤ers from
Angelsen (2001). The author analyses the deforestation process coming from "a
game" between a state and a local community seeking to appropriate tropical
forestland. He sets a marginal cost to expand available land, which depends on
the total forest and the land appropriate by the State. As the State provides
infrastructures, this marginal cost diminishes with State land appropriation
(corresponding to the infrastructure e¤ect) and with forest cover as new land
is more easily available (i.e. the scarcity e¤ect). In this paper, we theoretically
1See, among others, Ludeke et al. (1990) for Honduras, Nelson and Hellerstein (1997)
for Mexico, Liu et al. (1993) for the Philipines, Mertens and Lambin (1997) for Cameroon,
Chomitz and Gray (1996) for Belize, Sader and Joyce (1988) and Rosero-Bixby and Palloni
(1998) for Costa Rica, Cropper et al. (2001) for North Thailand.
2 In a more generally way, we design in this paper the infrastructure e¤ect (the scarcity
e¤ect) several factors reducing (increasing) the cost of deforestation.
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reformulate both concepts in another context. We consider a production cost
function exhibiting the infrastructure e¤ect or the scarcity e¤ect.
We consider and compare di¤erent scenarios. We rst assume that each
municipality establishes a protected area, deriving a symmetric Nash equilib-
rium. Then, when only one regulator provides the local public good, we obtain
an asymmetric Nash equilibrium. Finally, we retain a central regulator setting
protected areas for each municipality. We obtain several results. In all cases, we
nd that the infrastructure e¤ect always leads to smaller protected area than the
scarcity e¤ect. When only one regulator provides the local public good, in spite
of having spillover e¤ects, global deforestation is always reduced: asymmetric
regulation is so better than no regulation for forest protection. It appears that
the centralized provision of protected areas does not always work in favor of
forest protection under the infrastructure e¤ect contrary to under the scarcity
e¤ect. Finally we show that under the infrastructure e¤ect decentralized de-
cisions can reach the rst best without cooperation between regulators. We
complete our analysis with a study of the Brazilian protected areas. It corrob-
orates our theoretical results while removing theoretical indetermination, and
suggests that the infrastructure e¤ect can be important in the Brazilian Legal
Amazônia.
The article is organized as follow. In Section 2 we present the assumptions
of our model and the benchmark, i.e. the equilibrium of the economy without
protected areas. Decentralized regulation is presented in Section 3 whereas
centralized regulation in Section 4. Section 5 details our results depending on
the infrastructure or the scarcity e¤ect. In Section 6, we study protected areas
in Brazil. A conclusion is given in Section 7.
2 Assumptions and the benchmark
We rst present the assumptions of the model and then the benchmark.
2.1 Assumptions
We assume that primary forest cover is a public good, and that forest is cut in
order to produce a private good. A regulator decides to protect forest localized
in her municipality.3 To do that she determines the optimal area of forest and
implements it by means of a protected area. As we will see results will depend
on the strategy pursues by the regulator in each municipality.
We consider two municipalities (or two countries) i, i = 1; 2. In each
municipality, we denote by Ti the forest cover before any regulation (with
Ti = T i = T ). We assume a representative consumer in each municipality.
Her preferences are represented by the following quasi-linear utility function:
U(xi; gi; g i;M) = B(xi) + [kJ(gi) + (1  k)(J(g i)] +M 8i = 1; 2, where xi
is the private good sold at price pi, gi a local public good of which quantity
is measured by the forest cover and M the available revenue. Preferences for
3 In this article, we neglect the lack of property rights and assume perfect information.
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private good and local public goods are respectively given by the increasing and
concave functions B(xi) and J(gi). For example, consumers enjoy forest due
to their preferences towards nature, biodiversity or recreational activities. The
parameter k 2 [1=2; 1] indexes the degree of spillover: k = 1 means that citizens
care only about the public good in their own municipality while k = 1=2 means
that they care equally about public goods in both municipality (Besley and
Coate 2003). The parameter  is a weight representing preferences for forest in
general ( > 1).
The quantity xi of nal good is produced by a representative and competi-
tive rm in Municipality i. Producing xi units of nal good requires xi units of
cover forest and costs Ci(xi; xj) with Cixi > 0; Cixixi = 0. We will hereafter al-
ternatively take into account the following assumptions Cixixj < 0 or Cixixj > 0
in order to investigate how the cost of production matters in the protected area
setting. To take into account both e¤ects, we assume that the marginal cost of
production of a rm in a municipality depends positively or negatively on the
production level in another municipality. If the level of production increases
in Municipality j, forest is more (less) accessible and the marginal cost of pro-
duction in i diminishes (increases), representing the "infrastructure e¤ect" (the
"scarcity e¤ect").
2.2 The benchmark
As a benchmark, we dene the market equilibrium in both municipalities with-
out regulation for protecting forest. We rst nd the demand for the private
good. The representative consumer maximizes her utility. If R is the revenue
before any spending, we have M = R  pixi. We obtain:
Maxxi U(xi; gi; g i) = B(xi) + [kJ(gi) + (1  k)(J(g i)] +R  pixi
From the rst-order conditions, we nd:
B0(xi) = pi 8i = 1; 2 (1)
kJ 0(gi) = 0 8i = 1; 2 (2)
(1  k)J 0(g i) = 0 8i = 1; 2 (3)
The representative consumer chooses the private good quantity. From Equation
(1), this quantity is such that the marginal benet from consumption is equal
to the goods price. This equation gives us the inverse demand function. Local
public goods are consumed such as the marginal benet is null (see Eq. (2) and
(3)4 .
4Without public intervention the consumer does not consider that consuming the nal
good reduces his utility coming from environmental amenities. So rst-order conditions are
independent.
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The representative rm maximizes its prot, i.e.:
Maxxi i(xi; xj) = pixi   Ci(xi; xj)
The rst-order condition gives:
pi   Cixi(xi; xj) = 0 (4)
As the marginal cost is constant in xi, the o¤er function xi(p; xj) dened by Eq.
(4) is a step function. If the output price is lower than the marginal cost, the
production level is null and indeterminate if the price is equal to the marginal
cost. We have:
xi(pi; xj) =

0 if pi < Ci(p; xj)
0; C 1ixi (pi; xj)

else
From (1) and (4), the market equilibrium condition is given by:
B0(xi)  Cixi(xi; xj) = 0 (5)
If the Inada conditions are satised for the function B(xi), the price is posi-
tive and the equilibrium quantity of output is determined and set at xi. As
the quantity produced in one municipality depends on the quantity produced
in the other municipality we nd from (5) the best response functions. Ap-
plying the Implicit Function Theorem on Equation (5), we have dxidxj > (<)0
if Cixixj (xi; xj) < (>)0. The nature of the strategic interaction between the
production and deforestation levels depends on the cost function: under the
infrastructure e¤ect (the scarcity e¤ect) deforestation in i increases (decreases)
if the level of production increases in j. Hence the levels of deforestation and of
production are strategic complements in the rst case and strategic substitutes
in the second case.
Solving (5) for i = 1; 2, we obtain the Nash equilibrium without regulation.
Hence the size of the forest is Gi = T   xi 8i = 1; 2.
Because of several market imperfections, this economy cannot reach the opti-
mum. First, there is a negative externality of consumption: when the consumer
denes her demand function for the private good, she does not take into ac-
count the fact that her consumption leads to deforestation. Second, as dened
above, there are cost interdependencies induced by the infrastructure e¤ect or
by the scarcity e¤ect and, third, local public goods represented by forest in each
municipality.
3 A decentralized regulation
A regulator in one municipality decides to provide the local public good, i.e.
to regulate logging: she chooses to implement an integral protected area in
which logging will not be allowed.5 The regulator determines the optimal level
5We neglect, in this article, enforcement costs induced by the establishment of the protected
area.
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of private good and hence sets the size of the protected area. To do that she
maximizes the welfare in this economy:
Maxxi S(xi; xj) = B(xi) + [kJ(gi) + (1  k)(J(g i))]  Ci(xi; x i)
subject to Gi = Ti   xi  0
The rst-order condition is:
B0(xi)  Cixi(xi; x i)  kJ 0(gi) = 0 (6)
Compared to Equation (5) the regulator internalizes the negative externality
taking into account the third term in (6). As the optimal level of private good
depends on the quantity produced in Municipality j, we also nd a reaction
function. Applying the Implicit Function Theorem on (6) shows that the quan-
tity xi also increases (decreases) with xj if Cixixj (xi; xj) < 0 (> 0) and decreases
now with preferences with nature () and the parameter of free riding k. The
more k is important, the more consumers enjoy only forest in their municipality
and the free ridding e¤ect disappears. In this case, the negative externality is
entirely internalized in Municipality i, therefore reducing further the level of
production xi.
The equilibrium depends on the behavior of the regulator in the other munic-
ipality. The regulator j can also choose to regulate logging or "laissez faire". We
assume that both regulators take their decision simultaneously. The equilibrium
of the economy is so given by a Nash equilibrium.
3.1 The Nash symmetric equilibrium
If each municipality implements a protected area, the Nash symmetric equilib-
rium is obtained solving Eqs (6) for i = 1; 2. The quantities of private good are
given by xns and the size of the protected areas (AP ) is APns = Gns = T  xns.
3.2 The Nash asymmetric equilibrium
At the Nash asymmetric equilibrium Municipality 1 chooses to ght against
deforestation whereas the Municipality 2 does not. The equilibrium (xna1 and
xna2 ) is obtained from reaction functions given by Equations (5) and (6). The size
of protected area is APna1 = G
na
1 = T  xna1 and the forest cover in Municipality
2 is Gna2 = T   xna2 .
4 A centralized regulation
Under the decentralized regulation each municipality takes as a given the ex-
istence or not of a protected area in the other municipality. This regulation
enables to internalize the negative externality coming from consumption. How-
ever the regulator in each municipality cannot internalize alone neither positive
externality - the "spillover e¤ect" - nor the "cost e¤ect". The spillover e¤ect is
6
Études et Documents n° 11, CERDI, 2019
represented by the parameter k and comes from the fact that forest is a local
public good. The cost e¤ect comes from cost interdependencies represented by
the infrastructure e¤ect or the scarcity e¤ect. Hence the equilibrium described
in Section 3 cannot be optimal.
These externalities can be taken into account only by a supranational juris-
diction, one say a national or a federal level. In this case the national (federal)
regulator establishes the size of protected areas in each municipality (state)
maximizing the global welfare. This latter is composed of the sum of welfare in
both municipalities:
Max W g(xi; xj) =
2X
i=1
[B(xi)  Ci(xi; x i)] + [J(gi) + J(g i)]
subject to Gi = Ti   xi  0, i = 1; 2
The rst-order conditions are the following:
B0(xi)  Cixi(xi; xj)  Cjxi(xi; xj)  J 0(gi) = 0, i = 1; 2 (7)
By solving equations given by (7) we nd the cooperative equilibrium denoted
by xc. This time all externalities have been internalized. As in the decentralized
regulation, the negative externality has been taken into account. However the
centralized equilibrium also internalizes the free riding e¤ect since the levels of
production do not depend anymore of the parameter k, as well cost interdepen-
dencies. Now it is the "global cost e¤ect" which matters, by the second and
third term in Equation (7).
5 Cost functions
To analyze in which measure the nature of the production cost function impacts
the size of the protected area and the global level of deforestation, we derive
results retaining alternatively both following assumptions: the infrastructure
e¤ect and the scarcity e¤ect. In this section we set B(xi) = xi   x
2
i
2 and
J(gi) = gi   g
2
i
2 .
5.1 The infrastructure e¤ect
We investigate the assumption of "infrastructure e¤ect" and we set Ci(xi; xj) =
xi(1   xj) with  < 1. The marginal cost of production decreases with the
level of production in Municipality j due to the creation of infrastructures such
as roads. Without regulation the best response function in Municipality i is
given by:
xi =    (1  xj) (8)
The level of production in i increases with the quantity produced in j (strategic
complement) and with the benet parameter to consume good (), and decreases
7
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with the cost parameter (). If the regulator decides to implement a protected
area, its best response function is:
xi =
   (1  xj)  k[   T ]
1 + k
(9)
As in the case without regulation this quantity increases with (xj) and () and
decreases with () but also now with preferences for forest (), (), and the
free ridding parameter (k). Finally, if a centralized regulator decides to set a
protected area in each municipality, we nd:
xi =
   (1  2xj)  [   T ]
1 + 
8i = 1; 2 (10)
This function has similar qualitative properties as (9) except that it does not
depend anymore on (k).
Solving each equilibrium enables us to obtain the levels of production and
the size of each protected areas or forest. We begin to compare the "laissez
faire" equilibrium and the Nash symmetric equilibrium. We nd:
xns < x
Under the symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium regulators only internalize
the negative externality coming from consumption in each municipality. They
take as a given the "spillover e¤ect" induced by local public goods as well as the
"cost e¤ect". If both municipalities internalize the negative externality we nd
unsurprisingly that production levels are lower than levels without regulation.
Introducing the Nash asymmetric equilibrium, we obtain the following com-
parisons:
xna1 < x
na
2
and:
xns < xnai < x 8i = 1; 2
Under the infrastructure e¤ect, establishing a protected area only in Munic-
ipality 1 leads to an increase of the production costs in Municipality 2. Hence
the rm located in Municipality 2 has to decrease its production level, bearing
the "cost e¤ect". Finally quantities of the produced good at the Nash asym-
metric equilibrium are higher than at the symmetric one in both municipalities
but lower than the "laissez faire" quantities. Thus establishing a protected
area only in one municipality leads to preserve forest in another municipality
although this latter does not regulate. Asymmetric regulation is better than no
regulation at all for forest preservation.
Under the symmetric or asymmetric equilibrium, the size of the protected
area negatively depends on the level of deforestation in the other municipal-
ity. This result seems counterintuitive. However the higher the deforestation
in Municipality j, the lower the production costs in Municipality i. Hence the
usual trade-o¤ between marginal social benet and marginal social cost given
by Equation (6) balances toward an increase in production and so reduces the
8
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size of the protected area.
However these non-cooperative equilibria are not optimal because they nei-
ther take into account the spillover e¤ect nor cost interdependency. The coop-
erative equilibrium takes into account all these e¤ects. We nd:
xc < x and xc 7 xns or xna
The centralized regulation internalizes rst, the negative externality, second, the
free rider e¤ect and third, the cost interdependency. The two rst e¤ects lead
to a decrease in the level of production contrary to the third one. Under the
infrastructure e¤ect, implementing a protected area in Municipality i increases
the production cost in j leading to less deforestation in j. A way to reduce the
global cost is so to increase levels of production. Hence, if the two rst e¤ects
are higher than the third e¤ect, the centralized equilibrium protects more forest
than the Nash symmetric equilibrium. On the contrary, if the cost e¤ect is
enough important, the protected area sizes at the centralized equilibrium are
lower than the Nash symmetric equilibrium. Thus the good equilibrium for the
economy - the centralized one - is not the best equilibrium for forest preservation.
In the case where xns > xc if k = 12 , as x
c > xns if k = 1 and dx
ns
dk < 0 we
nd the following result:
9k 2 [ 1
2
; 1]=. xci = x
ns
This result suggests that the centralized equilibrium can be reached without
cooperation if preferences are such as k = k (see Figure 1). This point is
interesting because it is di¢ cult to obtain cooperation in a real world. Of
course this case can occur by chance. As k is the free ridding parameter it would
be di¢ cult to change it by a public policy. However,  represents preferences
toward nature. We can think that an active education policy can help to change
 in order to have xns() = xc, if  < . However this kind of policy would
have e¤ects only in the medium or long term and the impact on deforestation
could be to late.
5.2 The scarcity e¤ect
In this section, we set Ci(xi; xj) = xi(1 + xj) with  < 1 in order to take into
account the "scarcity e¤ect". The best response functions are the following
xi =    (1 + xj) (11)
without any regulation,
xi =
   (1 + xj)  k[   T ]
1 + k
(12)
under a Nash equilibrium, and
xi =
   (1 + 2xj)  [   T ]
1 + 
(13)
9
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Figure 1: Centralized and Nash symmetric equilibria depending on the parame-
ter k
under a centralized regulation. Compared with Section 5.1, we nd similar
qualitative properties for , ,  and k. However under the scarcity e¤ect the
level of production in i always decreases if the level of production increases in
j. After solving each equilibrium we obtain the following results:
xna1 < x
ns < x1
xns < x2 < x
na
2
with
xna1 < x
na
2
In conformity with intuition the levels of production are lower than the levels
without regulation if both municipalities internalize the negative externality.
Establishing a protected area only in Municipality 1 leads to a decrease in the
production cost in Municipality 2. Hence rms located in this municipality can
increase their production levels with respect to the unconstrained production
level (xi). Two e¤ects appear in Municipality 1 working towards a reduction in
the level of production: the negative externality and the cost e¤ect. Contrary
to the negative externality, the cost e¤ect cannot be internalized by a local reg-
ulator. A higher level of production in Municipality 2 increases the production
cost in Municipality 1. Finally the quantity at the Nash asymmetric equilibrium
is lower than the Nash symmetric one in Municipality 1.
10
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As far as forest preservation is concerned we nd:
2X
i=1
gnsi >
2X
i=1
gnai >
2X
i=1
gi
Establishing a protected area only in Municipality 1 leads to an increase of
deforestation in Municipality 2. But the net e¤ect leads to forest protection.
Implementing alone a protected area leads to globally preserve forest: asym-
metric regulation is better than no regulation at all.
Deriving the centralized equilibrium, we nd the following results:
xc < x and xc < xns
As under the infrastructure e¤ect, internalizing the negative externality and
the spillover e¤ects leads to a decrease in the levels of production. Under the
scarcity e¤ect, establishing a protected area in Municipality i leads to decrease
the production cost in j. So a way to reduce global production costs is to
reduce the levels of production. As the three e¤ects work in the same sense,
the centralized regulation always protects more forest than the Nash symmetric
equilibrium.
5.3 Results
In this section, we compare results in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. First, the equilibrium
quantities of private good are always higher under the infrastructure e¤ect than
under the scarcity e¤ect. Others results obtained in this paper are summed up
in the following Propositions:
Proposition 1 As far as total deforestation is concerned asymmetric regulation
is better than no regulation.
Proposition 2 Under the infrastructure e¤ect a centralized policy does not al-
ways work in favor of larger protected area than a decentralized policy contrary
to the scarcity e¤ect.
Proposition 3 The infrastructure e¤ect always leads to smaller protected area
than the scarcity e¤ect.
Corollary 4 The infrastructure e¤ect always leads to more deforestation than
the scarcity e¤ect.
Proposition 5 Under the infrastructure e¤ect the decentralized equilibrium can
reach the rst best.
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2:jpg
Figure 2: Evolution of protected areas and deforestation in the Brazilian Legal
Amazon, square kilometers. Source : INPE, authors calculations. Note that
protected areas are from federal and state entities but indigenous lands are not
included.
6 A study case: The Brazilian Legal Amazônia
Deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazônia has been greatly studied in the
literature because of the extent of the phenomenon and its adverse e¤ects on
biodiversity, the ecological system of the region and climate. From 54,534.2
km2 in 2001, deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazônia rainforest declined
to 27,136 square kilometers in 2004 and about 5,800 square kilometers in 2014
according to INPE. The decline of deforestation in Brazil is explained not only
by the 2008-2009 nancial crisis (Nepstad et al. 2009) but especially by the
hardening of conservation policies (Assunção et al. 2012; Hargrave and Kis-
Katos 2012; Nolte et al. 2013; Palmer and Di Falco 2012 among others).
These policies consisted mainly in the establishment of protected areas, mon-
itoring of deforestation and hardening legislation via the Action Plan for the
Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the Legal Amazônia (Plano de Ação
para Prevenção e Controle do Desmatamento na Amazônia Legal , PPCDAm).
Protected areas represented 42% of the area of the Brazilian Amazônia in 2009,
about 2 million square kilometers.
By Law No. 9.985 of 18 July 2000, Brazil created a formal, unied sys-
tem for federal, state and municipal parks, allowing classifying protected areas
in three categories: integral protection areas, sustainable use areas, and indige-
nous lands. Integral areas dene the fully protected areas. They are intended to
maintain the natural ecosystem without human interference and can be classied
12
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in the most restrictive categories of the International Union for Conservation of
Nature (IUCN) classication (categories I, II and III). In 2009 they accounted
19% of the protected surface areas. Sustainable use areas, which represented
for 32% in 2009, aim for sustainable use of renewable environmental resources,
maintain biodiversity and other ecological attributes. They are equivalent to
categories IV, V, and VI of the IUCN classication. Indigenous lands are lands
traditionally occupy by indigenous peoples. The Brazilian constitution recog-
nizes their inalienable right on these lands and confers them permanent posses-
sion of these lands after a formal process of demarcation. Indigenous lands are
devoted to the protection of the living space of indigenous peoples.6
Integral protection areas are managed by federal units and sustainable pro-
tected areas by municipalities. So the study of Brazilian protected areas can
illustrate our theoretical model because we nd two implementation levels, one
say, a centralized and a decentralized level. To conduct our study, we use data
on forest cover and protected areas in the Brazilian Legal Amazônia for the
period 2001-2009 available from the PRODES System of the Instituto Nacional
de Pesquisa Espacial-INPE (National Institute Space Research Center).
As shown in Figure 2, the implementation of the regulation through pro-
tected areas contributed to reduce drastically deforestation. However there is
no a protected area in each municipality. Even if spillover e¤ects with deforesta-
tion displacement may occur, deforestation is globally reduced in Brazil. That
supports Proposition 1 of our theoretical model.
We aggregate the municipal data into the 248 Minimum Comparable Areas
(MCAs) located in the Brazilian Legal Amazônia.7 To isolate protected areas
in zones where the scarcity or infrastructure e¤ect occurs, we take the distri-
bution of protected areas according to the remaining forest area in Minimum
Comparable Areas. The rst quartile corresponds at a forest cover rate less
than 5.2%, the second one at a forest cover between 5.2% and 25,43%, the third
one at a forest cover between 25.43% and 61.82% and nally in the fourth one
forest cover is superior to 61.82%. In Figure 3, we represent the average size of
protected areas with respect to the total deforestation in the quartile. Following
Angelsen (2001), we consider that the infrastructure e¤ect decreases relative to
the scarcity e¤ect as deforestation increases. We are so able to classify protected
areas in which the scarcity (infrastructure) e¤ect predominates. The scarcity
e¤ects should occurs in protected areas located in the rst quartile and the
infrastructure e¤ect in the last quartile.
Globally, Figure 3 shows that protected areas are higher under the scarcity
e¤ect than under the infrastructure e¤ect, satisfying our Proposition 3. We con-
sider that integral (partial) protection areas correspond to centralized (decen-
tralized) protected areas. Hence, we observe whatever the cost e¤ect driving de-
6 In this study case, we do not take into account indigenous land because they are mostly
created before the period 2001-2009. Moreover the aim of indigenous lands is di¤erent to that
integral or sustainable protected areas.
7Using MCA data allows comparison (because the number and size of municipalities may
change through time). The list of MCAs is available from the Brazilian Institute of Applied
Economic Research (IPEA - Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada).
13
Études et Documents n° 11, CERDI, 2019
Figure 3: Percent of protected area in terms of forest area by forest area quartile.
Source: INPE, authorscalculations.
forestation, centralized protected areas are higher than decentralized protected
areas. According to Proposition 2, it should be the case under the scarcity ef-
fect but the result is undetermined under the infrastructure e¤ect. According
to Figure 3, the cost e¤ect seems to be o¤setting the negative externality and
the free rider e¤ect exposed in our theoretical analysis in the Brazilian Legal
Amazônia. Finally, we see on Figure 4 that deforestation increases if the scarcity
e¤ect diminishes, as the Corollary of Proposition 3 notes. This study case not
only corroborates our theoretical results but also enable to remove theoretical
indetermination.
7 Concluding remarks
In this article we highlighted the mechanism leading to set the size of a protected
area. We have considered an economy composed of two municipalities. In
each one, forest is cut in order to produce a private good. Three kinds of
externalities are present: a consumption externality, local public goods and cost
interdependencies between rms. We investigated two assumptions about cost
functions: the infrastructure e¤ect and the scarcity e¤ect. Finally, we compared
the decentralized regulation and the centralized one.
We showed that decisions in other municipality about forest protection do
not determine the choice of implementing or not a protected area in a munici-
pality but a¤ect the surface of the protected area. This latter mainly depends
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Figure 4: Average surface cleared (deforestation) by forest area quartile. Source:
INPE, authorscalculations.
on preferences toward forest, on the rmsproduction costs and on the relation
between municipalities. We nd an optimistic result. In spite of having neigh-
boring e¤ects, implementing a protected area just in one municipality leads to
globally decrease deforestation. Hence, asymmetric regulation is better than no
regulation for forest preservation.
Comparison with centralized regulation depends on cost functions. Under
the scarcity e¤ect, the centralized regulation always leads to larger protected
area than decentralized regulation. Under the infrastructure e¤ect we rst show
that centralized regulation does not always work toward less deforestation. Then
it appears that decentralized decisions can reach, by chance, the rst best, i.e.
the centralized regulation. This result is important because it is known that
cooperation between regulators is di¢ cult to obtain. Otherwise an active ed-
ucative policy towards environmental protection may help to reach this equilib-
rium. Finally it appears that whatever the equilibrium considered (centralized
or decentralized level) the infrastructure e¤ect leads to smaller protected area
than the scarcity e¤ect.
We nally conducted a study case in the Brazilian Legal Amazônia. This
analysis not only corroborates our theoretical results but also removes a theo-
retical indetermination. It suggests that the infrastructure e¤ect matters a lot
in the Brazilian Legal Amazônia.
This article underlines the relevance of cost functions in the implementation
of protected area and in the assessment of neighboring e¤ects. Of course some
assumptions set in this article can seem restrictive. Among others, we assumed
perfect information. We know that in a real world regulators do not have com-
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plete information about production costs. This assumption is also crucial about
the benet evaluation coming from forest. We have also implicitly considered
full property rights and no enforcement cost. These assumptions can be crit-
icized mainly in developing countries. Further research could investigate how
taking into account some of these more realist assumptions could challenge our
results.
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